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Supreme Court of the State of Utah
DeLUXE GLASS ~CO·MPANY, a corporation,
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PRELIMINAR.Y

STATEM~ENT

In order to eliminate duplication arising from the filing
of several briefs and to minimize expense of printng, all
respondents other than George V. Martin, are joining herein
in a single brief.
In this brief the parties will be designated as follows:
Plantiff and interveners as "the materialmen," George V.
Martin as "the contractor," Capson-Bowman, Inc., as "the
owner," and General ·Casualty Company of America as "the
surety."
As stated in the brief of appellant, there are no issues
of fact in this case and, although the record is voluminous,
the facts are simple. They are substantially summarized
at page 14! of appellant's brief.
ARGUMENT
There are but two issues of law in this case, namely:
l. Are the materialmen entitled to recover the amount
of their respective claims from the surety? If they are so
entitled, the owner has complied with the provisions of
Section 17-2~1, U. C. A. 1943, and is relieved from liability
otherwise imposed under Section 17-·2-2 U ..c. A. 1943-.
1
,

·2. Is the surety entitled to recover over against the
owner?
These issues are considered in the argument presented
by appellant under Points I and II of its brief and will be
treated in the same order under the same numbered points
in this brief.
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POIN11' I
In order properly to determine the question presented
under this point, we must examine the provisions of the
statute, the contract between the owner and the contractor,
and the bond of the surety.
The Statute
The statute is in two sections, set out at pages 211 and
22 of the brief of appellant. The first section has three
elements. It prescribes when the bond is required, the conditions of the bond, and the remedy available under it. The
second section imposes personal liability upon the owner in
the event of his failure to procure the bond.
The statute was declared constitutional by this ·Court
in Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 U. 114, 16!7 P. 241.
It has been referred to in other cases, but, so far as we are
able to determine, has not been passed upon by this Court
in a case such as here presented.
The legislature in enacting the Statute doubtless concluded that a compelling public policy justified its highly
penal character, for wholly apart from the protection afforded laborers and materialmen under the lien Statute, the
act imposes upon the owner the duty of procuring the undertaking of a surety to pay their claims. The owner who fails
to procure such an undertaking finds himself personally
bound for the payment of the claims. But having procured
the promise of the surety the owner is relieved. The
laborers and materialmen have the promise of either the
surety or that of the owner for their protection. They
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cannot, however, have both. The undertaking of the surety
relieves the owner. ·Thus the test of our problem is found in
the inquiry as to whether the materialmen enjoy a right of
action against the surety. This is the nub of this phase of
the case, and has been so recognized by all parties since the
action was commenced.
Counsel for appellant stresses the fact that the statute
provides that the bond shall run to the owner and all others
as their interest may appear. We think this not an essential
element in the case. The heart of a bond is found in its
conditions. These largely determine and define the obligations of the surety. If the obligations of the surety are such
that they extend to others than the obligee named, then the
right of action flows to such persons as a matter of law.
The statute provides that the bond shall be conditioned
upon the faithful performance of the contract and prompt
payment for material furnished and labor performed under
the contract. The bond in qqestion here is conditioned upon
the performance of the contract, which brings us squarely
to the meat of our problem, namely, whether a bond conditioned only on the performance of the contract will support
a right of action in favor of a laborer or a materialman, or
must the bond be conditioned on both the performance of
the contract and the payment of labor performed and
materials furnished to support such right of action? Before
this question can be answered we must examine
The Contract
The contract of the parties is in a form issued by the
American Institute of Architects. 'This form of contract
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has been considered in many cases. In the case at bar the
contract documents covering the agreement between the
owner and the contractor consist of the general conditions
of the contract, the specifications and the drawings, and the
agreement. (Article 6 of the agreement.) The specifications and the drawings are not material to the question
here presented and were not introduced in evidence.
The original complaints of the materialmen pleaded
only certain provisions of the agreement without the general conditions of the contract (R. 1-10; 22-61). The demurrer of the surety was sustained to these complaints.
Thereafter the materialmen amended their complaints and
pleaded both the agreement and the general conditions of
the contract, attaching copies of the instruments to their
amended complaints (R. 133-164; 189-275A; 29·9~-304). The
surety demurred to. the amended complaints, and its demurrer was over ruled. Exhibit 1 received in evidence in
this. case is the agreement with the general conditions of
the contract attached. From this exhibit it is shown that
by Article 1 of the agreement the contractor is required to
furnish all the materials and perform all of the work shown
on the drawings and described in the specifications and to
do everything required by the agreement, the general conditions of the contract, the specifications and the drawings.
Turning to the general conditions of the contract, under
Article 9 it is provided that unless otherwise stipulated the
contractor shall provide and pay for all materials, labor,
water, tools, etc., necessary for the execution and completion
of the work. There are no contrary stipulations in the contract documents. Article 22 of the general conditions pro-
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vides, among other things, that if the contractor fails to
make prompt payment to subcontractors or for material or
labor, the owner, upon the certificate of the architect, may
terminate the employment of the contractor and take possession of the premises. Turning back to the agreement, in
Article 5 we find that before issuance of final certificate the
contractor shall submit evidence satisfactory to the architect
that all payrolls, material bills and other indebtedness connected with the work have been paid.
From these provisions it is seen that the contractor
is under the obligation and duty to erect the structure, but
this constitutes only a part of his obligations and duties
under the contract. In addition to the erection of the structure, he promises promptly to pay for all materials and
labor necessary for the execution and completion of the
work. If he does not do so, the owner may terminate the
contract, and finally the contractor is not entitled to final
payment under the contract until he submits evidence that
he has complied with its provisions in the payment for all
material purchased and labor performed. Thus the contract
contains an express promise on the part of the contractor
for the prompt payment for materials furnished and labor
performed under the contract.
Where a bond is executed to secure performance of a
contract, the contract and the bond must be construed together to determine the extent of the liability of the surety.
Walker Realty ·Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435,
2:11 P. 998. Having found that the contractor promised to
pay the claims of the materialmen, and the fact being that
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he failed to do so, to explore further the question of the
right of the materialmen to proceed against the surety
we must examine
The Bond
The contract is attached to the bond, (Eochibit 3) the
conditions of the bond are brief but extremely comprehensive. They are that
"* * * if the Principal shall well and truly
perform and fulfill all the undertakings, covenants,
terms, conditions, and agreements of said contract
during the original term of said contract and· any
extensions thereof that may be granted by the Obligee, with or without notice to the Surety, and during the life of any guarantee required under the
contract, and shall also well and truly perform and
fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions and agreements of any and all duly authorized modifications of said contract that may hereafter be made, notice of such modifications to the
Surety being hereby waived, then, this obligation to
be void ; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue."

In other words, the bond is conditioned upon the performance of every undertaking, covenant, term, condition
and agreement of the contract. From our analysis of the
contract we find that one of its essential undertakings and
covenants is that the contractor should promptly pay for
labor performed and material furnished.
Appellant in its brief at page 20 states that its position
consistently maintained throughout the proceeding is that
the bond is conditioned only for the proper completion of the
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building by the contractor. We agree that the surety has
consistently so contended, but we urge that in so contending
the surety is obviously in error. The above quoted plain
language of the bond is otherwise. 'The contractor, as we
have pointed out, was clearly obligated to discharge covenants other than for the completion of the building. Particularly he was obligated to pay for labor a~d materials.
Assume a case where under a contract such as here
involved the contractor completed the structure but paid no
bills for labor and material. The contractor tenders the
completed building with one hand and with the other
presents the owner with the unpaid .bills for labor and
material, which bills the owner, in the absence of a bond, is
personally obligated to pay. Could it seriously be contended
that the contractor under such circumstances has performed his contract? How then can it be seriously contended
here that the contractor, having promised to pay for labor
and materials and having failed to the extent of the claims
of the materialmen so to do, has nevertheless performed
his contract? The owner contracted for a completed building, it is true, but it did not contract to take a completed
building and itself be personally bound to discharge the
contractor's obligation to pay the claims of the materialmen.
The statute requires that the bond be conditioned upon
the performance of the contract and prompt payment for
materials furnished and labor performed. The contract in
question requires prompt payment for materials furnished
and labor performed. The bond, conditioned upon the faith..
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ful performance of the contract, is accordingly conditioned
upon the payment for material furnished and labor performed. Under such circumstances is there any need that
the bond be conditioned upon the performance of the contract and payment for material furnished and labor performed? We think obviously not. ·To add such a further
condition would only be surplusage. The whole includes
all of its parts, and if one of the parts of the contract is
the promise of the contractor to make prompt payment for
labor performed and materials furnished, nothing can be
added by conditioning a bond upon performane of the contract and the pa~ent for materials furnished and labor
performed. Surely the statute does not require that an
unnecessary or idle provision be set forth in the bond.
In those instances where the contractor is not bound
to pay for material furnished or labor performed and there
is no promise on his part so to do, then, in order to support
a direct right of action in favor of materialmen or laborers,
the bond must be conditioned upon the performance of the
contract and the prompt payment for materials furnished
and labor performed. But in cases such as here presented
the addition of the language requiring payment for material
furnished and labor performed would add nothing whatsoever to the bond. The foregoing analysis to us so clearly
demonstrates the right of the materialmen to sue upon the
bond in question that further pursuit of the problem seems
hardly necessary.
We have not undertaken to consider the principles
involved in recognition of the rights of third party beneficiaries. These principles have often been considered· by
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this ·Court in other cases and are so firmly established in the
law of this jurisdiction that nothing could be gained from
further exploration in this field of learning.
We shall, however, briefly review the law as stated by
authors treating the subject and as announced in the decisions of the courts.
·General Rule
The conclusion which we have reached in the analysis
of the statute, the contract, and the bond in question here
is fully supported by the great weight of modern authority.
Appellant has had occasion to refer to the very elaborate annotation appearing in 77 A. L. R., page 21. 'This annotation
deals with various phases of the right of materialmen and
laborers to bring an action directly upon the bond of a
contractor. Our precise problem is considered at page 62,
where the annotator announces the rule to be that:
"According to the majority view that laborers
and materialmen may recover on a building contractor''s bond conditioned for their payment, it is
generally held that they are entitled to avail themselves of a bond conditioned merely for the faithful
performance of the contract, and containing no express and direct provision for their payment, where
the contract expressly requires the contractor to
pay such persons or to satisfy all claims for labor
and materials."
The same question is further annotated in 118 ·A. L. R.
at page '57, and the rule at page 66 is stated to be that:
"According to the majority view that laborers
and materialmen may recover on a building con-
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tractor's bond conditioned for their payment, it is
held by the weight of authority, as pointed out in
the original annotation, that they are entitled to
avail themselves of a bond conditioned merely for
the faithful performance of a contract, where the
contract expressly requires the contractor to pay
such persons."
Before considering the numerous cases cited in support
of this rule, most of which are found in the two annotations,
supra, we shall analyze briefly the
Utah Decisions
·Counsel for appellant relies upon certain of these cases.
We shall consider them in the following order :
Montgomery

v.

Spencer, 1'5- Utah 495, .50 P. 623:, is a
1

case in which materialmen supplying labor and material in
the construction of the Utah Agricultural ·College brought
suit against a personal surety. The court denied the right
of the materialmen to proceed directly against the surety.
The case can be distinguished from the case at bar on two
grounds : First, the action is brought against a personal
surety; and, second, the contract contains no promise on the
part of the contractor to pay for labor performed or
materials furnished.
Smith

v.

Bowman, 32 Utah 33, 88 P. 6i8f7, like the

Montgomery case, is an action brought by materialmen

against the surety on construction growing out of the Utah
Agricultural 'College buildings. ·The bond was conditioned
for the protection of persons who might be entitled to file
liens against the property. The court held that inasmuch as
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the construction was a public building, no liens could be
filed. ·Consequently no right of action existed against the
surety. The case is distinguished from the one at bar because it is an action against a personal surety and the conditions of the bond are limited in application.

Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free et al., 46 Utah '233, 148 P. 427,
is an action by a materialman against a contractor and a
surety on a construction contract. This is. a case of a compensated surety. 'The bond in this case specifically provided that it should not cover or refer to any matter or thing
relating to the contract and specifications except such
clauses thereof as are recited in the bond made a part thereof. 'The court in this case begins to depart from the early
personal surety cases and intimates that a different rule
may apply with respect to compensated sureties. The court,
however, considered that it was bound by the limiting
language of the bond and denied liability against the surety.
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., supra, is
an action by an owner against a. surety of a subcontractor,
the subcontractor having installed defective elevators. The
owner was ·held entitled to recover on the contract between
the builder and the subcontractor and to sue the surety
which conditioned its bond on the performance of such
contract. The court makes a clear break from the doctrine
announced in the early Utah suretyship cases and impliedly
-overrules these cases at pages 486-7 in language as follows:
"It is not necessary to review the former decisions of the court referred to by counsel. If they
are not in harmony with the last expression of the
court, they are by implication overruled.''
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In Church v. Hartford, Ch~:ld & Co., 98 Utah 2:97, 9:5 P.
(2d) 736, the court holds the surety liable in a suit by the
owner but denies the right of a subcontractor to recover
against the surety for consequential damage resulting from
delay in performance. The court, however, at page 32:5 of
the Utah report, is careful to point out that the subcontractor is not in the position of a laborer or materialman
so far as the Marble Company's contract is concerned in
language as follows:
"'Child & Company is not in the position of a
laborer or materialman so far as the Marble 'C'ompany's contract is concerned. Hence, all the cases
cited by Intervener on this portion of the case are·
not in point."
None of the above cited cases involved the construction of said statute, in fact each case, except the Church
case, arose prior to its enactment.
In our analysis of these decisions there is nothing in
the expressions of this ~court in any compensated surety
case to support the contentions made by appellant under
its Point I. But, on the contrary, the fundamental principles upon which this Court relies, particularly in the
Walker Realty and Church cases, support the above stated
general rule. This rule is abundantly supported by
Decisions from Other Jurisdictions
We believe it to be unnecessary to encumber this brief
with quotations at length from the numerous cases which
have considered the precise question here presented.
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Topeka s·team Boiler Works Co., et al. v. U. S. Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 15 P. (2d) 416 (Kan.), is typical of the
many such cases. The contract there provided that:

"* * * Said party of the second part shall
furnish all labor and material, equipment, fixtures,
etc., necessary to construct, equip and install, and
shall so construct, equip and install all * * *"
The work to be done is specified.)
1

(

The general conditions made a part of the contract
provided that:

"* * * It is understood that the ~Contractor
shall pay in full, all persons who perform labor and
ninety percent (90%) of the cost of all material
placed in the job, before submitting monthly estimate and if called upon to do so at any· time hy the
~Chief Engineer, the Contractor shall furnish proof
that he has complied with the foregoing. Upon final
settlement he shall furn'ish satisfactory evidence
that all persons who have performed labor or furnished material under his contract, have been fully
paid, and in case such evidence is not furnished the
~Chief Engineer shall have the right to cause to be
retained any moneys due the ~contractor until all
liabilities are fully discharged by paying them from
such moneys as may be due him."
The conditions of the bond were that:

"* * * If the said principal shall faithfully
perform or cause to be performed all of the terms
and conditions, warranties and guarantees of said
contract, and of the said specifications therein referred to in accordance with the true spirit and intent of said contract, and shall do and perform each
and every act on his part to be kept and performed
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according to the terms and conditions of said contract, then this obligation to be void, otherwise, to
be and remain in full force and effect."
The court in holding the materialmen entitled to recover
on the bond of the surety announced the rule as follows :

"* * * When, from the contract as a whole,
it is clear that the contractor was to pay for material
and labor necessary for the construction of the building, and a bond is given to secure· the faithful performance of the contract, materialmen and laborers
who have not been paid may sue directly upon the
bond."
The facts of the case and the rule are succinctly stated
by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Forburger Stone Co.
v. Lion Bonding & Surety Co., 170 N. W. 89·7, as follows:
"A building contractor entered into a contract
to construct a building, and gave a bond for the faithful performance of the contract. This defendant was
surety on the bond. The plaintiff furnished material
to the contractor which was used in the construction
of the building, and he brought this action against
the surety on the bond to recover the value of the
material. The bond required the contractor to perform all of the conditions of his contract, and one
of the conditions of his contract was that he should
pay for all the materials which he used in the building. ·Therefore this contractor's bond contained an
agreement for the benefit of this plaintiff, and it has
been frequently held by this court that, under such
circumstances, a party for whose benefit the contract was made can maintain an action directly
against the party who has contracted for his benefit.
Doll v. ·Crume, 41 Neb. 65-5, 59' N. W. 806, and cases
cited. And various other decisions of this court are
to this effect."
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Other cases announcing substantially the same principle are:

Knight & J. Co. v. Castle (1909), 172 Ind. 97,
27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 5·73, 87 N. E. H7·6;
National Surety Co. v. Rochester Bridge Co.,
(192 5), 8'3 Ind. App. 195, 146 N. E. 415;
Jordan v. Kavanaugh (1884), 6·3 Iowa 152, 18
N. W. 851, infra (followed in Wells v. Kavanaugh (1886), 70 Iowa 519, 30 N. W. 871);
Algonite Stone Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity & D. Co.
(1917), 100 Kan. 28, L. R. A. 19'17D, 722,
163 Pac. 1076·;
Cooke v. Luscombe (1931), 132 Kan. 147, 294
~Pac. 84·9;
Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. United States Gypsum Co. (193~) 23.9 Ky. 247, 39'S. W. (2d)
234;
Orinoco· Supply Co. v. Shaw Bros. Lumber Co.
(Orinoco Supply Co. v. Illinois Surety Go.)
(1912.), 160 N. ·C. 42r8, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.)
707, 76 S. E. 273;
Barringer v. Fidelity & D. Co. (1H31) 159 18. E.
•373;
Hollerman Mfg. Co. v. Standard Acci. Ins. Co.
(19'3'1), 61 N. D. 6'37, 239 .N. W. 74'1;
American Surety Co. v. Noe (193'2), 245 Ky. 42,
5·3 s w. ('2d) 178;
Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. Plank, 16~3 Va. 819,
178 S. E. 58.
1

1

1

We will not undertake in this brief to distinguish or
analyze the cases from other jurisdictions cited by appellant in support of its position on Point I other than to suggest that in certain cases the contract may be fou.nd to contain no promise by the contractor to pay laborers and materialmen. In others the bond may be conditioned upon the per-
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formance of some, though not of all, of the terms and conditions of the contract. Some courts have been troubled
with questions of privity where the owner was under no
obligation to pay for materials or labor. No problem of this
character arises in this jurisdiction because of the personal
liability imposed upon the owner under the statute. In the
final analysis, however, it must be said of any case found to
be strictly in point and which denies the right of materialmen or laborers to recover upon the bond of the surety,
that such case is contrary to the great weight of modern
authority.
Obligees under the Bond
The point is made by appellant that the materialmen
are not named as obligees in the bond. This is true. The
question, however, is whether they need be so named. If
the materialmen as a matter of law have a direct right of
action against the surety, then, under the statute, it is immaterial whether or not they are named as obligees in the
bond for the owner in affording such right of action has
complied with the statute. We have concluded that the
bond is conditioned for the prompt payment for all material
furnished and labor performed under the contract. Having
reached this conclusion, the right of action on the bond
flows to the materialmen. The general rule to this effect
is stated in 9 Am. Jur., Building and Construction leontracts, Sec. 95, as follows:
"Although there are a few decisions to the contrary, the great weight of authority establishes the
general rule that a person furnishing materials or
labor may recover on a building contractor's bond
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to the owner, where it contains a condition for his
benefit and is intended for his protection, although
the owner is the only obligee named in the bond, and
there is no express provision that it shall inure to
the benefit of laborers or materialmen or that they
may avail themselves of the security thereof."
This 1Court announces the same principle in Walker
Realty Co. v. American Surety c·o., supra, at page 450 of
the Utah report as follows:

"* * * Whenever it appears from a contract
that there is a clear intent to benefit a third party,
whether specifically named in the contract or not,
such person, ordinarily, may sue in his own name for
the enforcement thereof or for the benefits arising
therefrom. This general proposition, we believe, is
well sustained by the great preponderance of judicial
opinion in the several states of the Union."
If there were any real doubt as to the right of the
materialmen to sue upon the bond, even though they are
not named as obligees therein, such doubt is removed by a
consideration of the requirements of the statute. Title 17,
U. C. A. 194.3, is in two chapters~ ·Chapter 1 requires the
furnishing of a bond upon public contracts. Chapter 2. deals
with such requirements on private contracts. The bond required of the owner under private construction is obviously
a statutory bond. The rule of law is firmly established that
when a statute requires a bond to be given and a bondsman
undertakes to furnish it, the provisions of the statute are
read into the terms of the bond and any of its text at
variance with the statutory requisites is ignored. Of the
many cases announcing this rule, particularly in point is
1
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the recent case of Van ll'ert National Bank v. Roos, 17 N.
E. (2d) 65~1 (Ohio). In that case, as in the case at bar,
the bond contained no provision that it was conditioned
upon payment of sums to laborers and materialmen, nor
were they named as obligees therein. The Supreme ·Court
of Ohio held this omission to be immaterial, saying in part:
"A contractor's bond, given for the full and
faithful performance of a contract for a public improvement, will be construed with reference to the
statute pursuant to which it is given, and any provision omitted therefrom, which is required by statute to be included therein, will be read into the bond
and deemed as fully a part thereof as if expressly
therein written. This is so on the theory that the
additional obligation required to be included in the
bond was intended by the Legislature for the protection and benefit of laborers, materialmen and
subcontractors, and that the contractor and surety,
in giving the bond, intended to comply with the statutory provisions requiring such obligation.
"'Consequently the bond herein questioned
inures to the benefit of those who performed the
labor and furnished material to the contractor in
connection with the construction of the ditch improvement."
The conclusion reached by the Ohio court is stated to be
the general rule in 11 ·C. J. S., Bonds, p. 420.
~c·onclusions

on Point I.

These propositions, then, appear to be established : The
purpose of the statute was to require of an owner that he
furnish a bond under which materialmen and laborers
would enjoy a right of action against a surety, and in de-
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fault of so doing that he would become personally liable to
them. The contract of the parties specifically requires the
contractor not only to construct the building but also to pay
materialmen and laborers. The bond, conditioned upon the
faithful performance of the contract, is necessarily conditioned upon the payment of the claims of the materialmen.
The bond in question complies with the statute because it
affords the prescribed remedy to the materialmen. It is immaterial that the materialmen are not named as obligees in
the bond because they enjoy a right of action thereon as a
matter of law. If there be any omission in the bond it will
be read into the instrument and deemed as fully a part
thereof as if expressly therein written.
The judgment of the trial court on Point I must therefore be affirmed.
1

P'OINT II
'The determination of the question presented under this
point requires an examination of the pleadings.
The surety filed a cross complaint against its codefendant, the owner ( R. 377-382). Only the allegations under
paragraph numbered 11 of the cross complaint need be considered in connection with Point II. In that paragraph the
surety alleges that the owner violated the terms of the
contract in that it failed to secure lien waivers and paid
the contractor payments in excess of ninety per cent of the
contract price prior to completion of the entire work, which
acts of the owner were alleged to be to the prejudice and
damage of the surety. The owner, in its answer to the cross
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complaint, denies these allegations of damage and prejudice
and thereby puts in issue these questions ( R. 62-64) .
Appellant in its brief bases its claim for damage and
prejudice upon said two allegations of its cross complaint.
We are at a loss to understand the ground of appellant's argument with respect to the lien waivers. The parties
stipulated that no lien or claim of lien was filed by any
person furnishing material or performing labor in connection with the construction under the contract (R. 348-350).
The materialmen all waived their liens by failing to file.
Appellant asserts that the only fair conclusion that can be
drawn from the failure to require lien waivers is that the
surety was thereby prejudiced.
Appella~t

does not define a lien waiver. We are therefore not informed as to the construction it seeks to place
upon the term. We assume, however, that it has treated the
term in its true meaning. A lien waiver is not a receipt or
an acknowledgment of the payment of the debt, though a
receipt may be incorporated into an instrument which contains a waiver of lien. It may be that appellant fails. to
distinguish between a lien waiver and a receipt or acknowledgment of payment. A waiver is the giving up, relinquishment, or surrender of some right. Missouri State Life Ins.
Co. v. LeFevre, 10 'S. W. (2d) 267 (Texas). A lien waiver is
precisely what the term implies-a surrendering or giving
up of the right to charge property with a lien for the payment of a debt. Such right may effectively be surrendered
by a failure to act, as well as a voluntary relinquishment.
Appellant has not undertaken to point out how the position
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of the surety is now different than it would have been had
voluntary waivers been secured. Obviously no such showing can be made, for the position of all parties, including
materialmen, is now precisely the same as it would have
been had instruments of waiver been obtained. We can see
no merit whatever to the claim of the surety on this ground.
Has the surety been damaged or prejudiced by any
failure of the owner to retain from disbursements the percentage prescribed by the contract? The contract provides
that:
"The Owner shall make payments on account of
the Contract as provided therein, as follows:
"On or about the 1st and 15th day of each month
90 per ·cent of the value, based on the Contract prices
of labor and materials incorporated in the work,
and of materials suitably stored at the site thereof
up to the 1st and 15th day of that month, as estimated
by the Architect, less the aggregate of prevous payments; and upon substantial completion of the entire
work, a sum sufficient to increase the total payments
to 90 per cent of the Contract price."
From these provisions it is seen that the contract contemplated that twice each month the architect would estimate the value based on contract prices of material incorporated into the work and stored on the site and that
payment should be made of ninety per cent of such value
based upon the architect's estimates.
Admittedly the owner and contractor did not follow
this exact procedure. Payments were not made on the first
and fifteenth days of each month, nor did the archi teet furnish an estimate twice each month of the value of materials in-
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corporated in the work and stored on the site. The actual
procedure was this: the owner made the first four payments
to the contractor on the basis of the receipts and lien waivers
attached to the respective checks. Thereafter, and commencing with the disbursement of August 17, 1946, the owner
disbursed upon the certificates of the architect the precise
amount certified by him in each case to be payable. It is conceded that the architect's certificates do not show an estimate of the value of the materials incorporated into the
work, nor the value of the materials stored on the site,
with a computation of ninety per cent of the total as the
basis for the disbursement. He did, however, certify that,
in accordance with the terms of the contract, there would
be due and payable on the specified date the amount authorized by the certificate. To the certificates are attached receipts and, in some cases, lien waivers; further supporting
the amount of each disbursement. In this way each disbursement subsequent to August 17, 1946, and up to and
including that of January 17, 1947, was handled. By the
latter certificate, the architect certifies that the contract sum
was then $32,176.00, on which there had been certified and
paid $30,217.69, leaving $1,9~5.8.31 not yet certified. T'urning to the stipulation (R. 348), we find that a final extra
of $230.00 was allowed for tile floor. This amount added
to the $19~58.31 equals the sum of $2 1 188.3~1 paid into- court.
We are unable to follow the mathematical calculations
by which counsel for appellant arrive at the conclusion that
the owner made unauthorized payments to the contractor
in the total sum of $10,211.70. This figure cannot be supported. In order to so demonstrate, we need not go through
1
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each of the progress payments but only to look- to the total
disbursed. Under the above quoted contract provisions, the
owner was obligated on substantial completion of the entire
work to have then paid the contractor ninety per cent of
the contract price. The contract price, with additions
and deductions, was $·32,406.00. The owner at the time
of substantial completion, in strict performance of the
contract, should have then paid the contractor an aggregate amount equal to ninety per cent of the contract
price, to-wit; $-29,16!5.4~0, and to have then retained
$3240.60. Under the actual facts of this case, the building
was substantially completed subsequent to the disbursement
of January 17, 19'47, and prior to the payment into court of
the sum of $2'188.3·~ on 1Septemb~r 20, 1947. At the time
of such completion, the retention in the hands of the owner
under the strict language of the contract should have been
said sum of $3240.60. 'The owner actually held $2188.31.
The difference of $:1 052.:29· constitutes the only amount
which can be claimed as paid above the required retention.
Assuming that the owner should under said contract
provisions have had on hand $1052.29 more than it held at
the time of substantial completion, does this prove that the
surety has been damaged to this extent or at all? We think
clearly not. Nowhere in the pleadings, the evidence, or
in the argument in this case has the contention ever been
made or is it now made by the surety that any of the funds
paid by the owner to the contractor were misapplied or
did not go into the construction. No attack was made upon
the certificates of the architect or claim asserted that they
are false in any particular. No suggestion has been ad-
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vanced that the owner or contractor did not proceed in the
utmost good faith in their dealings under the contract or
that the construction might have been carried forward
otherwise than as advanced.
The surety asserts that if the owner had retained more
money the "kitty" would have held more funds for the payment of the claims of the materialmen. Obviously, if the
owner had paid less, it would have held more, but would
the actual position of the parties have been altered? An
example will show that it would not. ·On January 17, 194,7,
the architect certified a disbursement of $927.15. Appellant contends that this disbursement was unauthorized. Had
the owner retained these funds, and refused payment of
the claims thereby discharged it would clearly have had
more cash on hand, but the claims paid by disbursement
of the $927.15 would have remained unsatisfied and would
have been asserted in this proceeding and the actual position
of the surety would remain unchanged. ·The same reasoning
can be applied to any disbursement to demonstrate that a
retention would have operated to increase cash on hand but
also to increase the amount of the unpaid bills and would in
no manner have improved the actual position of the parties.
On the contrary, had the owner failed to make payments in the manner pursued by it, the surety might very
well have suffered a much greater loss than actually
sustained. A point not to be overlooked in this case is the
fact that the contractor did complete the building. Had
the owner at some phase of the construction held the contractor strictly to the terms of the retention provisions and
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deprived him of the ability to then discharge some item for
labor or materials, it is not unreasonable to suppose that
the ability of the contractor to go forward might have been
impaired. As the matter worked out, the completion of the
building by the contractor unquestionably operated to minimize the loss.
S.imply stated, this is a case in which a contractor undertook in September, 1945, to complete within ninety days
a building which was not fully completed for approximately
two years. The actual cost of the building exceeded the
contract price of $3:2·,406.00 by an amount equal to not less
than the sum of the claims for which the materialmen recovered j udgm.ent. The contractor went broke on the job
and there were insufficient funds in the contract to pay the
costs of construction. Nothing which the owner did or failed
to do adversely affected the position of the surety in the
matter.
Appellant in effect asks this ·Court to hold, as a matter
of law, that a failure on the part of the owner to comply
with the retention provisions of the contract releases the
surety at least to the extent of the unwithheld percentage.
Reliance is placed on Paxton v. Spencer, 71 Utah 313, 265
P. 7:511. This case was reviewed and further considered in
Church v. Hart ford,. Child & Co., supra. In the latter case
this Court at page 309~ of the Utah report observes that:

"* * * But the trend of the later well-considered cases where compensated surety companies
are involved is toward releasing the surety only to
the extent of his prejudice."
and announces the rule to be
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"* * * As applied in this case, we hold that
failure to retain the 10% and payment of vouchers on
all marble instead of delivered marble only, did not
release the surety entirely but only to the· extent
that it was prejudiced thereby.
In commenting on Paxton v. Sp.encer, the court observes:

''Paxton v. Spencer * * * seems, partially
contrary. to this holding, since in that case we held
that failure to retain the 10%, although not releasing the surety completely, did release it to the extent
of the 10%. But in that case the court found damage
to the surety in the failure to retain the 10%.

*

*

*

*

*

"But if Paxton v. Spencer, supra, meant to hold
that in all cases as a matter of law the surety was
damaged by failure to retain the 10% even though
it was necessarily and reasonably expended on the
contract, we think the decision failed to follow
through and is against the weight of authority and
the actualities of the situation."
Burden of Proof
As here shown, the issue of damage and prejudice arises
in this case from the allegations of the surety in its cross
complaint and the denial of the owner in its answer thereto.
The proof of damage and prejudice is part of the surety's
cause of action. The burden of such proof rests upon it. 'The
cases so hold. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Eagle River U. F. H.
School Dist. et al., 205 N. W. 92.6, is typical of many such
authorities. 'There the court recites certain of the facts
and states the ·rule as follows:
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"The school district and the contractor in good
faith sought. to work out the situation, and to make
it possible for the contractor to complete the work.
This might or might not have resulted to the benefit
of the surety, but it by no means appears in this case
that the surety suffered any damage by reason of this
conduct, and by failing to show that it was damaged
it has failed to prove a cause of ·action, or that it
was released from the obligations which it had voluntarily assumed."
To the same effect are :

Board of County Commissioners v. U. S. F. & G.,
150 P. 590;

National Surety Co. v. Haley, 159, P. 2:92; and this court
In Church v. Hartford, Child & Co., supra, at pages 308
and 309 of the Utah report makes reference to the same rule.
Conclusions on Point II
There is no substance to the claim of the surety that it
was damaged by the failure of the owner to procure lien
waivers. The failure of the owner in any respect to comply
with the provisions of the contract relating to retention
of percentage in the disbursement of funds to the contractor
in no way damaged or prejudiced the surety. The rule prevails in this jurisdiction that a surety is released by the
failure of the owner to retain stipulated percentages prescribed in a contract only to the extent of the surety's damage or prejudice. The burden of proof on the issue of damage or prejudice rested upon the surety in this case and was
in no manner discharged by it.
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The trial court properly applied the controlling law to
the facts presented under the cross complaint of the surety
against the owner, and its judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

HURD & HURD,
Attorneys for Pla!l.ntiff and R'e'spondents, DeLuxe Glass Comr
pany;

VAN CO'TT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCAR'TH:Y,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondents, Capson- Bowman,
Inc.;

SAMUEL BERNSTEIN,
Attorney for Intervener andRespondents, A. Be~tein;
A~LBERT

R.

B~OWEN,

Attorney for Intervener andRes_pondew,ts, Anderson Lwm1ber
Company;

A. WALLY

SAND~.A:CK,

Attorney for Interv·eners and
Respondents, J. Henry Chapman and George A. Chapman,
Co-partners, doing business as
Chapman Plumbing and H eOtting Company;

OSCAR W. GRAY,
Attorney for Intervener andRespondent, Mill Creek Lumber
and Transit Mix Company;

ROMNEY & BOYER,
Attorney for Interv·eners and
Respondents Morrison- Merrill
Company, Rio Grande Lumber
Company, R. H. Mulholland and
Wilford W. Gardner.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

